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Journal > The Nature And Scope Of The Armistice Agreement

The Nature And Scope Of The Armistice Agreement

October 11th, 2021

In all efforts to replace the Korean ceasefire agreement, the main considerations are the definitive end of the Korean War and the creation of a solid basis for lasting peace. Both objectives can be better served by the four-party negotiations currently being proposed by the United States and the Republic of Korea, accompanied by a duly supported Security Council resolution. The two Koreas, the United States and the PRC, were the main belligerents at war; they have played a predominant role in maintaining the ceasefire; and they have the clearest long-term interest and the ability to contribute to a lasting peace in Korea. As a result, one or more agreements between these four parties can effectively end the state of armed hostilities in Korea and lay the foundation for a lasting peace. The Security Council can and should use its authority to put an end to the many persistent anomalies of the Korean War and, in accordance with its resolution 83 (V) of nearly half a century ago, “to finally restore international peace and security in the region”. One of the important objectives in reorienting the demarcation lines between the territory held by Israel and the territory held by the Hashemite Kingdom was the liquidation of the bands of no man`s land built during the hostilities to separate the opposing forces, but which, after the end of the fighting, were an unnecessary waste of rare earths and a permanent source of friction. The liquidation of these no man`s land was successfully carried out along the line, with the exception of Jerusalem itself and the territory of the immediate northwest of the Holy City. The problem of the liquidation of the remaining no man`s lands currently dominates the work to be done within the framework of the Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom — the Israeli Joint Ceasefire Commission. To a large extent, this problem falls within the repo of the “special committee”, an institution specially created by the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. 22 Notes 1 and 4 above.

The Buenos Aires Protocol (note 3 above), which suspended hostilities in the Grand Chaco, is, however, for ratification. This was one of his many variations of the usual truce of modern times. 87 Politis, a.o.o. 130. Phillipson, a.o.o. 69, says that these two ceasefire agreements omitted demarcation lines. However, that of Epirus provided that the Turks occupied the right bank of the Arachtos River and that the Greeks retreated to the left bank; And that of Thessaly established that a line of demarcation was to be drawn afterwards. This happened and a neutral zone 5 km wide was set up (Politis, a.o.o. 136). Each of the other governments that have contributed to the UN armed forces is a ceasefire party, participated in the Geneva conference (except South Africa) and has the legitimate right to be a party to a new agreement replacing the ceasefire agreement. However, none of these other Governments is necessary to find a political solution to the Korean situation and none has played a lasting role in the ceasefire. Indeed, it would be possible to argue that the passage of time and its non-participation in subsequent events have eliminated the need for their participation – that any bellicose status they once had no longer exists due to despair.

The United States could, as a courtesy to former allies, inform each of these governments of the progress of all negotiations and ask them to approve any agreement. But their public support and the adoption of an appropriate Security Council resolution, which commits them, seem sufficient to refute any argument that these governments have continued to be belligerent towards the DPRK or the PRC. . . .